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The constitutional aspects of aviation present many problems
of grave concern to those interested in aeronautical legislation.'
Here, as in many other fields, the chief issues involve the divi-
sion of powers between the Federal Government and the states.
The recognized social desirability of uniform regulation of air-
craft has influenced Congress to enact legislation covering a
wide field of control. Much of this, however, -ill undoubtedly
be attacked by those adherents of states' rights who believe that
under our form of government the principle embodied in an
act is of greater importance than its effects.
Federal control of aircraft had been urged for many years,
but doubts as to the power of Congress to enact suitable legis-
lation for a long time delayed any action.2 At one period it
was suggested that a constitutional amendment giving Congress
power to control aeronautics be adopted.3 This solution, which
is still occasionally advanced,4 failed to find support mainly be-
cause of the delay necessarily involved in securing the amend-
ment. Moreover, it was believed by many that Congress already
had ample authority to enact adequate legislation, particularly
* The author acknowledges the assistance of Mr. Herbert E. Kaufman
of New York City in the preparation of this article.
I The reports of the Committee on Aviation of the American Bar Associa-
tion, which has had considerable influence on the development of aviation
legislation, supply evidence of the important part that constitutional ques-
tions have occupied in its deliberations. See 46 A. B. A. REP. 77, 498 (1921).
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have also taken an active part
in this development. Likewise the report of the House Committee on the
Air Commerce Act of 1926 deals largely with the constitutionality of the
proposed statute. See REPORT OF THE ComuIrrTEE oN INTERST,%TE AND FOR-
EIG.Z COi2mRCE, March 17, 1926.
2 See F. P. Lee, The Air Commerce Act of 1926 (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 371;
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE AcT oF 1926 (1928), prepared
by the office of the legislative counsel and issued by the government.
3 In 1921, the tentative judgment of the Bar Association Committee was
that "the best ultimate solution of this question is one that will put the
United States on a par with other nations, and that is a constitutional
amendment, which will extend the power of Congress to legislate on flight
through the air." See 46 A. B. A. REP., supra, note 1, at 81.
I See Cuthell, Development of Aviation Laws in ti United States (1930)
1 AIR L. REV. 86.
5 Many theories were advanced, upon which, it was believed, federal con-
trol over aeronautics could be sustained. For discussions of these theories,
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under the "commerce clause." 6 Consequently, after several bills
see Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 271, 303;
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, supra note 2; note
(1922) 10 CALIF. L. REv. 232. The contention that the ratification of the
International Air Convention would, under the treaty power, put the regula-
tion of aeronautics in the hands of Congress received much attention. This
position rested on State v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416. 40 Sup. Ct. 382 (1920)
(federal control over migratory birds). The view that such legislation
would be sustained under the commerce clause, however, finally prevailed.
See infra note 15.
It was also urged that Congress could legislate on this subject by virtue
of its powers over navigable waters. The House Committee in charge of
the bill which became the Air Commerce Act of 1926, found its authority
for various parts of the Act by analogy to the maritime power of the
Federal Government. Especially important is the proposition reached
thereby that Congress has the power to grant a public right of flight.
See infra at note 66. In respect to control of intrastate commerce in nav-
igable waters, Congress derives its power from two sources: (1) the pro-
vision vesting admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the Federal Govern-
ment, U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. III § 2; the "commerce clause." It is often
difficult to determine from the cases under which section a particular act
is sustained. See 2 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1929) § 571. Even conceding that the analogy is sound in
respect t'o subject matter, i.e. that, like navigable waters, the air space
forms a continued highway over which commerce may be carried on with
other states or foreign countries, the problem is in no measure solved. The
question remains whether the specific regulation attempted by Congress is
necessary or appropriate, because in its control over navigable waters under
the "commerce clause" "its sovereignty [does not] extend over them to the
exclusion of that of the States in which they may be situated." WILLOUGHBY,
op. cit. supra. Under the provision conferring admiralty jurisdiction upon
the federal courts, Congress may pass regulatory acts to some extent. It
has been argued that such authority would not justify the regulation of
aeronautics. 46 A. B. A. REP., supra note 1, at 504: "It appears to us that
it would be undesirable for the art of civil flight through the air to assume
that jurisdiction over it rests within the constitutional extension of the
judicial power of the United States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
with the constitutional general grant of power to Congress to make laws
for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the
government of the United States or any of its departments or officers."
The soundness of the analogy must now be considered extremely doubtful
in view of the decision that airplanes are not subject to maritime jurisdic-
tion. Crawford Bros., No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (W. D. Wash. 1914) ; note (1914)
28 HARv. L. REV. 200; (1914) 3 CALIF. L. REV. 143. For an adverse criti-
cism see (1915) 49 Am. L. REv. 599. But cf. Reinhardt v. Newport Flying
Service Corp., 232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371 (1921).
6See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, in.fra note 28; Bogert, supra note 5, at 308. See
also MacCracken, in an address reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, at 65: "Uniform regulation of aeronautics is
admittedly not only desirable, but absolutely indispensable to the effective
development of aerial transportation as an instrumentality of interstate
commerce. It therefore seems reasonable to believe that the legislation for
the regulation of aeronautics by the Federal Government would be sus-
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had been defeated,7 the Air Commerce Act 8 was passed in 1926.
By this Act, and by the Air Commerce Regulations promulgated
thereunder by the Secretary of Commerce," Congress has at-
tempted to provide for the regulation, in certain instances, of
all aircraft. That it was the intention of Congress to subject
the whole field of aeronautics to federal control", is evident
from a perusal of the important provisions of the Act and of
the Regulations.11 The extent to which these provisions appear
to conflict with constitutional limitations upon the powers of
Congress will first be discussed.
From the point of view of social desirability, it would seem
that the most important provisions of the Air Commerce Regu-
lations are the Air Traffic Rules 22 which are specifically stated
to apply to all aircraft whether engaged in commercial or non-
commercial, interstate or intrastate, flight.' 3 These rules cover
generally such traffic problems as the passing and approaching
of aircraft, minimum heights at which machines may be flown in
regular and acrobatic flying, taking off and landing, lighting
equipment and practice, and other similar matters. They are
authorized by the Air Commerce Act which provides:
"The Secretary of Commerce shall by regulation: Establish
air traffic rules for the navigation, protection, and identification
of aircraft, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight, and
rules for the prevention of collisions between vessels and air-
craft." 14
It is not clear that all of the rules are authorized by this section;
tained as constitutional, notwithstanding the fact that its scope would be
broad enough to regulate both interstate and intrastate aerial navigation."
7See Lee, op. cit. supra note 2.
844 STAT. 2119 (1925), 49 U. S. C. § 171 (1926). For an escellent dis-
cussion of the Act, see Lee, op. cit. supra note 2. See also Davis, Clearing
The Air For Commerce (1927) 131 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCL 141;
Williams, Federal Legislation Concerning Civil Aeronautica (1928) 76 U. of
PA. L. REv. 798; (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 989.
9See MacCracken, Air Regulations (1927) 131 ANN. Am. ACAD. POL. &
Soc.' ScI. 118. The Regulations have been amended slightly since first
published.
10 The statement of the managers in charge of drafting the Air Commerce
Act is part of the Regulations. § 73 reads: "In order to protect and pre-
vent undue burdens upon interstate and foreign air commerce, the air traffic
rules are to apply whether the aircraft is engaged in commercial or non-
commercial, or in foreign, interstate or intrastate navigation in the United
States, and whether or not the aircraft is registered or is navigating in a
civil airway."
n1 See Lee, op. cit. supra note 2; Bogert, Recent Developments in the Law
of Aeronautics (1922) 8 CORN. L. Q. 26.
12 Ai CoMmE=c EzCIULATIONS §§ 70-79.
23 See supra note 10.
1444 STA. 2119 § 3e (1925), 49 U. S. C. § 173(e) (1926).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
any not so authorized are, of course, invalid. And if authority
for all of them can be found in the section, and any one of them
is invalid because unconstitutional, the Act is unconstitutional in
so far as it authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to make such a
rule. These rules will undoubtedly prove the cause of more liti-
gation than any of the other Air Commerce Regulations.
In enacting the Air Commerce Act, Congress proceeded under
the "commerce clause." - Consequently, various dicta of the
Supreme Court defining the powers of Congress under that
clause were strongly relied upon in making the Air Traffic
Rules specifically applicable to all aircraft. For example, in
Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States,-, it was said:
"Congress [does not] possess the authority to regulate the
internal commerce of a State, as such, but . . . it does possess
the power to foster and protect interstate commerce, and to
take all measures necessary and appropriate to that end ...., 17
And in the Wisconsin Rate Case,Is the Supreme Court defined the
powers of Congress to include anything "it deems necessary or
desirable" '" for the development of interstate commerce
agencies. It is not at all certain, however, that each of the Air
Traffic Rules is "necessary or desirable" or "necessary and
appropriate" for the development of interstate commerce
by aircraft.2 0 Those who object to the encroachment of federal
upon state sovereignty will therefore find adequate grounds for
opposing this interference by the national government with in-
trastate flight. The extent to which such opposition will succeed
in the courts must be considered in the light of present views
as to the power of Congress under the "commerce clause."
25 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, supra
note 2.
'16 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833 (1914).
17 Ibid. 353, 34 Sup. Ct. at 837.
18 Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 257 U. S.
563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232 (1922).
1 "Ibid. 590, 42 Sup. Ct. at 238; see also New York v. United States, 257
U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 239 (1922).
20 In Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761, 763
(N. D. Ohio 1929), the court expresses a doubt as to whether "... . all of
these rules must be applied to both intrastate and interstate craft in order
to secure the safety of the latter." And see Lee, op. cit. supra note 2, at 375:
"The dividing line as to Congressional power is not interstate and foreign
commerce on the one hand and intrastate commerce on the other, but be-
tween intrastate commerce which it is necessary for the Federal Govern-
ment to regulate in order adequately to protect and prevent burdens upon
and discriminations against interstate and foreign commerce and intrastate
commerce which it is not so necessary for the Federal Government to reg-
ulate in order to afford such protection and prevent such burdens and dis-
criminations."
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The constitutionality of the Air Traffic Rule 21 providing that
500 feet shall be a minimum altitude for flight was involved in
a receit decision in a United States District Court in Ohio."
In that case, a farmer in the fields with his horses was injured
when the horses were frightened by the passage overhead of a
dirigible carrying a supply of newspapers from one town il
Ohio to another. The plaintiff sought damages on the ground of
negligence, alleging among other things, a violation of the 500-
foot altitude rule contained in the Air Commerce Regulations.
The Court, on a demurrer attacking its jurisdiction, refused to
pass upon the constitutionality of the rule, but expressed the
opinion that:
"If the circumstances and conditions under which air com-
merce is carried on are such that it is, necessary for the altitude
rule to apply to and regulate intrastate flights in order to pro-
tect interstate movements, then it will so apply, the same as
to an interstate flight." "'
This approach, based upon the theory recited in the ;.,.,ns:n
Rate Case, 2 appears to be sound. It tests the validit.y of each
rule by ascertaining whether it is necessary or appropriate for
the effective regulation and control of interstate air commerce.
The question thus becomes purely one of fact.25
21 Aa COMERCE REGULATIONS § 74 (g) : "Exclusive of taking ,iff from
or landing on an established landing field, airport, or on property desig-
nated for that purpose by the owner... aircraft shall not be flom:
(1) Over congested parts of cities, towns or settlements, except at a
height sufficient to permit of a reasonably safe emergency landing, which
in no case shall be less than 1,000 feet.
(2) Elsewhere at height less than 500 feet, except where indispensable
to an industrial flying operation."
= Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 20. See (1930)
43 HAxv. L. REv. 837; (1930) 78 U. PA.. L. Rev. 663. See aLo Craig v.
Boeing Air Transport, Inc. [1929] U. S. Av. Rep. 101 (W. D. Wash.).
23 35 F. (2d) at 763. The court cited Railroad Commission of Wisconsin
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., supra note 18; New York v. United States, supra
note .19; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 482
(1916) ; ZOLLMANN, LAW OF THE AM (1927) § 58.
24 Supra note 18.
25 Although a question of fact exists, this question is for the court and
not for a jury. 5 WIGISTOOE EvmE.cE (2d ed. 1923) § 25.5d. For a dis-
cussion of the method by which the court receives information of the
alleged facts, see Bikl6, Questions of Fact Affectizg Constitutionality
(1924) 38 HAxv. L. Rev. 6; Barnett, External Evidence of the Constitu-
tionality of Statutes (1924) 58 AM. L. Rev. 88; WIGMORE, op. cit. stipra.
In Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 86 Ark. 412, 111 S. W. 456,
aff'd, 219 U. S. 453, 31 Sup. Ct. 275 (1911), and in Atlantic Coast Line
v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 34 Sup. Ct. 829 (1914), testimony of those en-
gaged in the business involved and familiar with the exigencies of its
operation was received by the courts in order to determine whether certain
state regulation was an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
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Upon this basis the Air Traffic Rules are generally considered
to be constitutional; 26 but there has been some dissent.21  In
an effort to discover the trend of available opinion upon this
question of fact, the writer prepared and distributed a question-
naire 28 among transport pilots actively engaged in commercial
26 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWs, 320 (1922); MacCracken, op. cit. supra note 6;
Williams, Law of the Air (1911) 18 CASE AND COMMENT 131; Zollmann,
Governmental Control of Aircraft (1919) 53 AM. L. REv. 897; Bogert,
op. cit. supra note 11.
2, See HOTCHKISS, AVIATION LAw (1928) c. IX; and two inadequate notes
(1924) 27 LAw NOTES (N. Y.) 182; (1923) 46 N. J. L. J. 291. HoTCHKIsS,
op. cit. supra, at 70, after a consideration of the statement of managers in
charge of the bill (Regulations § 79), goes on to say, ". . . it is believed that
the provision in its broadest terms is unconstitutional."
28 One hundred and seventy-one answers were received from transport
pilots associated with flying schools, transport companies, taxi companies,
and major aircraft manufacturers.
QUESTIONNAIRE
Bear in mind that no question is raised as to the pcwelr of Congress to
regulate aircraft engaged in interstate commerce. The issue is solely as to
the power of Congress to regulate all aircraft (including those engaged
in non-conmercial flight, and in commercial flight solely within the boun-
daries of one state) for the purpose of preventing interference with inter-
state commercial flight.
In your opinion, is it necessary or appropriate for the effective regulation




1. Requiring all aircraft flying in established civil airways
to keep to the right side? .... .. . .. ... .... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  163 6 2
2. Fixing the order and manner in which all aircraft shall
give way to each other? .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . ... . ... .  164 6 1
3. Fixing the manner in which all engine-driven aircraft
shall cross each other? ....... . .. .. .. . ... . ... . .... ... . .. ..  164 7 0
4. Fixing the manner in which all approaching engine-
driven aircraft shall pass each other? . . .. .. .. .. .. . ... .. ... 164 7 0
5a. Imposing upon all overtaking aircraft the duty of keep-
ing clear of the overtaken craft? .... .. . ... .. .. .... .. .. . ... 164 6 1
5b. Fixing the manner in which all overtaking craft shall
keep clear of the overtaken craft? .......................... 158 10 3
6. Fixing the minimum altitudes at which all aircraft may
be flown? ..... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . ... .. .. . ... . .. .. .. .. .. .  124 32 15
7. Prohibiting all acrobatic flying except in conformity to
the Air Commerce Regulations pertaining thereto? .......... 142 26 3
8. Prohibiting dropping from all aircraft in flight any ob-
ject or thing which may endanger life or injure property,
except when necessary to the personal safety of pilot, pas-
sengers or crew? ......................................... 160 10 1
9a. Prohibiting the navigation of all aircraft by any per-
son under the influence of, using, or having personal posses-
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aviation, both interstate and intrastate, throughout the United
States. It would seem that the opinions of such pilots, being
based upon actual experience, are valuable indications of the
necessity and propriety of Federal control over the flight of all
aircraft. Answers were received from pilots all over the
country; 29 the results may thus be considered fairly representa-
tive. They indicate decisively that the general feeling is that
the adequate protection of interstate commercial flight requires
all flight to be similarly regulated s3" There are a few rules,
however, concerning which there is a marked difference of
opinion. It is these which are likely to be the ones most fre-
quently before the courts.
The question whether it is necessary or appropriate for Con-
gress to impose rules and regulations upon those engaged in
gliding and soaring in aircraft without power was answered in
the negative by about 347. Comments attached to some of
the answers disclosed the opinion that Federal regulation of
such aircraft would be proper only if this mode of flight were
to develop a wider range of utility. At first blush, it is difficult
to conceive of the necessity for such regulation. So-called gliders,
at least at present, are primarily instruments of sport. They
sion of intoxicating liquor, cocaine, or other habit-forming
drugs while on duty? ..................................... 166
9b. Prohibiting the navigation of all aircraft carrying pas-
sengers who are obviously under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, cocaine, or other habit-forming drugs? ............... 148
10. Fixing take-off and landing rules which all aircraft
must observe? ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  157
l1a. Fixing the types of lights to be shown by all aircraft
in flight between one-half hour after sunset and one-half hour
before sunrise? ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
11b. Fixing the manner of showing such lights on all air-
craft? .................................................. 165
12. Requiring all unlicensed aircraft to display an iden-
tification mark assigned by the Secretary of Commerce? ..... 155
13. Requiring the seller of all unlicensed aircraft to report
certain information (name of buyer, etc.) to the Secretary
of Commerce? ............................................ 152
14. Requiring all aircraft flying over large bodies of water
to carry certain life-saving supplies and devices? ............ 157
15. Prohibiting licensed pilots from piloting unlicensed air-
craft carrying persons or property for hire? ................ 136
16. Imposing rules and regulations upon those engaged in








29 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
30 See supra note 28.
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are not, and very likely cannot be, operated in established air-
ways. There is the possibility, however, that interstate air-
craft may be operated in proximity to a place where gliders
are used. Whether the courts will consider such a possibility
sufficient justification for the subjection of this type of aircraft
to Federal regulation is difficult to predict, although the negative
view of most answers is some indication of the course which
may be adopted when the question arises.
Concerning the necessity for the other rules regulating intra-
state flight there was less dissent. It seems arguable that, in
most situations covered by the rules, the possibility of inter-
ference with interstate commerce exists if intrastate flight be
not subjected to like regulation. But, in a few instances, this
possibility appears so remote as to lead to the conclusion that
Congress is regulating intrastate flight primarily for police pur-
poses, and incidentally, if at all, to protect interstate commerce.
Examples may be found in the rules aimed solely at aircraft
carrying passengers for hire. It might be contended that acci-
dents to passengers engaged in intrastate flight would have such
an untoward effect on the business of interstate carriers, that
Congress is justified in imposing safety regulations on such air-
craft to foster the development of interstate commerce. This
argument, however, is obviously a tenuous support for these
rules.
A recent amendment to the Regulations, published after the
preparation of the questionnaire, provides that aircraft carrying
passengers for hire shall not fly lower than the minimum altitude
under any circumstances whatsoever.31 Prior to this amend-
ment, deviation from the minimum altitude rule was proper when
it was required "because of stress of weather conditions or other
unavoidable cause." 32 Now a pilot of an airplane carrying pas-
sengers for hire must descend if weather conditions make it un-
safe or impossible to maintain the required minimum altitude.
While the rule may be salutary as an attempt to protect pas-
sengers, as well as persons and property on the ground, this
offers no basis for sustaining its constitutionality. There does
not seem to be even a remote connection between the regulation
of intrastate and interstate flight in this respect. As the rule
is thus primarily a police measure, its constitutionality in so
far as intrastate flight is concerned is dubious.
There is some disagreement, too, as to whether the minimum
altitude rule itself is valid in its application to intrastate flight."
This also appears to be largely a police regulation. A few
31 AIR COMMERCE REGULATION.S 79 as amended.
32 AiR COMMERCE REGULATIONS § 79.
3 See answers to Question 6, supra note 28.
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answers to the questionnaire expressed the belief that fix-
ing the minimum altitude at which intrastate aircraft may fly
is neither necessary nor appropriate for the regulation and pro-
tection of interstate flight; some doubted its validity. This
doubt was likewise shared by a Federal District Court to which
the question was presented. ' The answer will likely be given
by the appellate courts in the near future.
Another rule which seems to be largely a matter of police
protection is that which prohibits the navigation of all aircraft
carrying passengers who are obviously under the influence of
intoxicants. While there is a possibility of danger to inter-
state flyers from an airplane carrying such passengers it seems
quite negligible, and it may well be doubted that the prevention
of such danger was the purpose for which the rule was made.
If here also the measure is in fact designed only for the pro-
tection of persons and property, the mere possibility of protec-
tion to interstate commerce would seem to afford little basis
for the contention that Congress 3' is acting upon matters within
its constitutional powers.
In addition to the use of the "commerce clause," a more novel
theory has recently been advanced3 7 upon which such regula-
tion could be sustained. It is contended that the states do not
have sovereignty over the upper air space and accordingly do
not have the power to enact legislation affecting it. This theory
is based upon the premise that air space is a domain separate and
distinct from the land beneath it. Reasoning from this premise,
it is argued that the states could have acquired sovereignty
thereof only before statehood, which was not done; and, there-
fore, that Congress alone could have acquired such sovereignty.3
The theory would make the position of Congress paramount,
34Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., stepra note 20.
35 AIR COAMnERCE REGULATioNS § 74 (L).
z- Within this term is included anyone delegated to act for Congress, here
the Secretary of Commerce.
3. See F. P. Lee, Air Doainin of the United States, reprinted in LEGISLA-
TiVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, supra note 2, at 104.
3 Although there is no express provision in the Constitution authorizing
the acquisition of new domains by the United States, authority and power
to do so arises from its inherent powers as a sovereign nation. The subject
of sovereignty in air space in international law is outside the scope of
this article. It has received a great deal of attention, and excellent dis-
cussions will be found by: Bouvi, The Development of International Rules
of Conduct In Air Vavigation (1930) 1 AIR L. REv. 1; Fagg, The Inter-
natiTtal Air Navigation Conrentions and Coammercial Air Narigation
Treaties (1929) 2 S. CALIF. L. REV. 430; F. P. Lee, op. cit. supra note 37;
Bogert, op. cit. supra note 5, at 273-280; B. Lee, The International Flying
Convention and The Freedonn of the Air (1919) 33 HAne. L. REV. 2,3; ZOLL-
MI.A.N, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1-5; FIXEL, THE LAw OF AWATION (1927) e
IV; Myers, The Sovereignty of the Air (1912) 24 GREEN BAG 220, 430;
Valentine, The Air-A Realm of Law (1910) 22 JuR. REv. 16..
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although it recognizes in some measure the sovereignty of the
states. Thus state sovereignty would exist as to the surface
air space, which has been defined as that measured by the reason-
able height of user of which its citizens can avail themselves. 39
Congress also would have power to legislate in respect to surface
air space in so far as it is necessary in the exercise of its
powers under the Constitution.40 Difficulties in the application of
this theory, however, while perhaps not affecting its merit, will
likely cause it to be disregarded.41 Furthermore, it is not at all
clear that the premise on which it rests is sound. It would be
difficult indeed to convince -a layman that the air is a domain in
the sense that land is, and it is probable that it would be equally
as difficult to convince a court.
Section 47 of the Air Commerce Regulations, defining the
privileges of, and restrictions upon, licensed aircraft pilots, pre-
sents an interesting problem under the "due process" clause.
Among other things, the Section provides that a licensed pilot
shall not operate unlicensed aircraft carrying persons or
property for hire and that a private pilot may operate licensed
39 Althpugh the state's powers would be limited, it could make compliance
with "state registration and certification laws a condition to navigation in
its surface air space." F. P. Lee, op. cit. supra note 37. But even this
power would be limited by the power of Congress over interstate com-
merce: Ibid. A potent argument has been made to the effect that the
sovereignty over the air is in the states, except as limited by the Constitu-
tion. See Bogert, op. cit. supra note 5, at 293: "There can, however, be no
effective argument against State sovereignty over the space above the land
within its borders. Such space is, under modern conditions, actually within
the control of the subjacent State by police aircraft and by guns. And acts
within such space, of course, vitally affect the subjacent State with respect
to the safety of its inhabitants and their property." This view is incor-
porated in § 2 of the UNIFORM STATE LA.Nv FOR AERONAUTIcs: "Sovereignty
in the space above the lands and waters of this State is declared to rest
in the State, except where granted to and assumed by the United States
pursuant to a constitutional grant from the people of this State." See
Smith v. New England Aircraft Company, Inc., 170 N. E. 385, 389 (Mass.
1930).
40 See F. P. Lee, supra note 37, at 130.
41 It is fairly obvious that the precise boundary between the surface air
space and the upper air strata will be difficult to determine.
The "zone theory" of the air was considered at one time in the interna-
tional law aspect of the problem of sovereignty, and resembles the theory
under discussion. See Myers. op. cit. supra note 38, at 430-1. One of the
chief criticisms of the "zone theory" was the extreme difficulty of fixing
the zones satisfactorily. As pointed out by Valentine, op. cit. supra note 38,
at 20: "A practical objection to the delimitation of a territorial zone may
be mentioned-the extreme difficulty of determining the height of an aerial
object from below . . . even roughly to estimate the height from time to
time of a moving vessel seems almost out of the question. To make the
legal position of an aeronaut depend on whether he is or is not 1500 metres
above the earth is therefore impractical as it is illogical." See also ZoLL-
MANN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 2.
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aircraft only. There is a well recognized rule that one who
applies for and obtains a government license thereby subjects
himself to the rules and regulations imposed in connection there-
with. This rule, however, under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, is subject to the limitation that the regulations im-
posed must be constitutional.42
The question arising here is whether forbidding a licensed
pilot from earning money by piloting unlicensed aircraft de-
prives him of his life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Unquestionably, this provision deprives the commercial
pilot of an opportunity to obtain a lucrative return for his
services in piloting such an airplane. It also prevents a private
pilot from gaining the flight hours necessary for a higher grade
license by flying an unlicensed airplane which can be purchased
or rented for substantially less than a licensed one. If the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions applies,'3 the provision
would appear to be invalid. The Supreme Court has not yet
gone so far as to hold a condition imposed by federal authority
unconstitutional; whether the doctrine will be so extended as
to afford protection from federal regulations alleged to deprive
an individual of "life, liberty, or property" without due process
of law is the issue involved. Its determination will doubtless
be influenced by the desirability of dissuading pilots from oper-
ating aircraft which are not sufficiently airworthy to qualify
for a federal license.
The Air Commerce Regulations ' and some state statutes '0
require that persons involved in aircraft accidents shall file
written reports. In many states similar provisions with respect
to automobile accidents may be found. Whether one of these
latter provisions constituted a violation of constitutional guar-
antees against self-crimination was considered in a recent
42 See infra note 48. For example, where a foreign corporation receives
a license to do business within the state, subject to the condition that it
shall not sue in the federal courts, the condition is unconstitutional and the
license cannot be revoked if the foreign corporation sues in the federal
courts. Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188
(1922).
43 Perhaps the strongest case for the application of the doctrine is one
where the condition results in the deprivation of life, liberty, or property'
without due process of law.
" - While no case has arisen in which a federal statute has been held in-
valid under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, "there is no reason
to anticipate that federal immunity therefrom will continue if its wider
application becomes established." Merrill, op. cit. infra note 48, n. 42.
45 § 29.
46 Conn. Laws 1929, c. 253 § 31; Mass. Order of Dept. of Public Works,
June 10, 1929, [1929] U. S. Av. Rep. 607; Pa. Laws 1929, c. 316 § 704; VL
Laws 1929, Act No. 79, § 11; Va. Regulations of Corp. Comm., July 1, 1929,
Rule 34, [1929] U. S. Av. Rep. 856.
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case. 7 The statute was held invalid. The question has never
been raised in the federal courts; the specific problem is whether
the privilege of engaging in aeronautics may be withheld unless
the privilege against self-crimination is waived. If the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions is applicable, failure to file a report
could not be made a crime.4
8
A correlative phase of the constitutional problems of aero-
nautical legislation involves the validity of numerous state laws.
While the movement for federal legislation was in progress,
the state legislatures were busy enacting a variety of statutes
respecting aviation until at present forty-seven states have such
laws; '9 not all, however, are regulatory. In some instances,
47 Rembrandt v. City of Cleveland, 28 Ohio App. 4, 161 N. E. 364 (1927) ;
commented on (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 971. In this case, a city ordinance
required a complete written report of the accident to be submitted to the
proper officials, as do the statutes cited supra notes 45 and 46. Statutes re-
quiring a driver involved in an accident merely to identify himself have
been held constitutional in the few cases which have arisen. People v. Rosen-
heimer, 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530 (1913); Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo.
632, 147 S. W. 983 (1912) ; People v. Diller, 24 Cal. App. 799, 142 Pac. 797
(1914). For discussions see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2259 (d) ;
(1913) 13 Col. L. REV. 745; (1912) 12 COL. L. REV. 731; Cf. 5 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra at § 2377.
48 If a grant or license is given subject to a condition which is unconsti-
tutional, it is as if no condition had been attached. See Merrill, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions (1929) 77 U. of PA. L. REV. 879; Oppenheim, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions and State Power (1927) 26 MICH. L. REV. 176.
Such statutes might be upheld despite the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, on the grounds that they do not operate to protect a personal
privilege, such as the privilege against self-crimination, Merrill, op. cit.
supra, at 893, nor as against those conditions which are imposed for the
public protection. Oppenheim, op. cit. supra, at 188. And see WIGMORE, op.
cit. supra note 47.
49 Ariz. Laws 1929, c. 38; Ark. Acts 1927, no. 17, Acts 1929, no. 96, Acts
1929, no. 135; Cal. Stat. 1921 c. 783, Stat. 1927 c. 169, c. 267, c. 404, c. 805,
Stat. 1929 c. 193, c. 847, c. 850; Colo. Laws 1927, c. 64; Conn. Pub. Acts
1927, c. 324, Pub. Acts 1929, c. 236, c. 253, c. *135, c. 281, Sp. Acts 1929, no.
194, no. 197, no. 266; Del. Laws 1923, c. 199, Laws 1929, c. 248, c. 249; Fla.
Laws 1925, c. 11339 (see (1929] U. S. Av. Rep. 482,et seq.), Laws 1929,
c. 13569, c. 13574, c. 13666; Ga. Laws 1927, p. 779; Idaho Laws 1925, c. 92;
Laws 1929, c. 137, c. 146, c. 283, c. 88, c. 106, c. 108; Ill. Laws 1927, p. 297,
p. 616, Laws 1928, p. 85; Laws 1929, p. 172, p. 557, p. 590; Ind. Acts 1927,
c. 43, Acts 1920, p. 160, Acts 1921, p. 91, Acts 1917, p. 174, Laws 1929, c. 171,
c. 57, c. 134; Iowa Laws 1929, c. 133, c. 135, c. 136, c. 137, c. 138, c. 229;
Kan. Laws 1921, c. 264, Laws 1929, c. 11; Ky. Laws. 1926, c. 107, Laws
1928, c. 77, c. 78; La. Laws 1926, no. 52, Laws 1928, no. 5; Me. Laws
1923, c. 220, Laws 1925, c. 185, both repealed, Laws 1929, c. 265; Md. Laws
1929, c. 318; Mass. Acts 1922, c. 534, Acts 1925, c. 189, Acts 1928, c. 388;
Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, no. 224, Pub. Acts 1927, no. 138, no. 182, no. 329,
Pub. Acts 1929, no. 177, Pub. Acts 1926, no. 9, Pub. Acts 1929, no. 148, no.
193, no. 210, no. 24, no. 82; Minn. Laws 1921, c. 433, Laws 1923, c. 34, Laws
1925, c. 406, Laws 1927, c. 62, Laws 1929. c. 219, c. 290. Miss. Laws 1928,
Act of April 26; Mo. Laws 1929, p. 122, p. 124, p. 345; Mont. Laws, 1929, c.
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these state laws impose air traffic rules.O In so far as the
federal Air Traffic Rules are valid, the state regulations must
conform; 51 for even though the states have concurrent jurisdic-
tion with Congress, when the latter acts, the former may do
nothing inconsistent. Some states require the local registration
of airplanes and the licensing of airmen.s2 In such a case, the
17; Neb. Laws 1929, c. 34; Nev. Laws 1923, c. 66; N. H. Laws 1929, c. 182;
N. J. Laws 1928, c. 63, Laws 1929, c. 311; N. M. Laws 1929, c. 71; N. Y.
Laws 1928 c. 233, c. 373, Laws 1929, c. 187; N. C. Laws 1929, c. 190, c. 90;
N. D. Laws 1929, c. 85, Laws 1923, c. 1; Ohio Laws 1929, p. 28, p. .54; Okla.
Laws 1929, c. 238; Ore. Laws 1929, c. 352, Laws 1921, c. 45, c. 49, Laws 1923,
c. 186, c. 202; Pa. Laws 1929, Act 316, Act 317; R. I. Laws 1929, c. 1353. c.
1435; S. C. Laws 1929, Act 189; S. D. Laws 1925, c. 6, Laws 1929, c. 70;
Tenn. Laws 1923, c. 30; Tex. Laws 1919, c. 9, Laws 1929, c. 285, Penal
Code (1925) Art. 6900; Utah, Laws 1923, c. 24; Vt. Pub. Acts 1923, no.
155, Laws 1929, no. 79; Va. Laws 1928, c. 463; Wash. Laws 1929, c. 157;
V. Va. Laws 1929, c. 61; Wis. Laws 1929, c. 348, c. 201; Wyo. Laws 1929,
c. 66. For a discussion of the state laws, see Freeman, Survey of State
Aerona-utical Legislation (1930) 1 AiR L. Rnv. 61; (1922) 22 CoL. L. R'v.
754. The various state laws are collected in [1928] U. S. Av. Rep. and
[1929] U. S. Av. Rep.
so Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 850, §§ 2, 3; Colo. Regulations of Comm. of Aero-
nautics, [1929] U. S. Av. Rep. 450; * Conn. Pub. Acts 1929, c. 253, §§ 26,
35, 38, 40; Del Laws 1929, c. 248, §§ 2-8; Idaho Laws 1929, c. 137, § 2 (g),
§ 3 (c), Dept. of Pub. Works, Aeronautics Bull. no. 2; Ill. Laws 1929, p. 172
§ 2 (f) (g) (h); Iowa Laws 1929, c. 135, § 7; MAe. Laws 1929, c. 265; Md.
Laws 1929, c. 318, § 15; Mass. Acts of 1928, c. 388, § 10; Mich. Pub. Acts
1929, no. 148, § 3-a; Minn. Laws 1929, c. 290, § 2; Neb. Laws 1929, c. 34, §
4; Nev. Flying Rules and Regulations of Pub. Ser. Comm., Feb. 5, 1929,
[1929] U. S. Av. Rep. 668; N. H. Laws 1929, c. 182, § 4; N. M. Laws 1929,
c. 71, § 7; N. D. Laws 1929, c. 85, § 2; * Ore. Laws 1921, c. 45, §§ 7, 8, 11;
Pa. Laws 1929, Act. 316, Art. IX; R. I. Laws 1925, c. 1435, § 13; Va. Order
of State Corp. Comm., July 1, 1929, [1929] U. S. Av. Rep. 846; Wash. Laws
1929, c. 157, § 5; * W. Va. Laws 1929, c. 61 §§ 11, 12; Wis. Laws 1929, c.
285, § 3 (114.21).
* These statutes enact air traffic rules inconsistent with those issued by
the Secretary of Commerce.
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, adopted by twenty states and
Hawaii prohibits low or dangerous flying. § 9. See Freeman, op. cit. supra
note. 49, at 70.
In those states in which no Air Traffic Rules are provided, but which
require pilots to hold a federal license, the federal Air Traffic Rules apply
ipso facto.
51 Where Congress may regulate intrastate commerce as an incident to its
regulation of interstate commerce, the States have concurrent jurisdiction
to regulate, which, however, must not be inconsistent with the federal regu-
lations. See 1 WLLOUGHBY, Op. cit. supr, note 5, at 115, 1007.
52 State licenses are required for all aircraft and airmen by these states:
Ark. Acts 1927, no. 17; Conn. Pub. Acts 1927, c. 324; Fla. Laws 1925, c.
11339; Kan. Laws 1921, c. 264; Mlass. Gen. Laws, c. 90 amended, Acts 1922,
c. 534, Acts 1925, c 129, Acts 1928, c. 388; Pa. Laws 1929, c. 316.
State or Federal licenses are required for all aircraft and airmen: Me.
Laws 1929, c. 265; Md. Laws 1929, c. 318; Blinn. Laws 1929, c. 290; N. H.
Laws 1929, c. 182; Ore. Laws 1929, c. 352; Va. Laws 1928, c. 463.
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issue is whether the condition imposed unreasonably interferes
with interstate commerce.53 For instance, an aircraft carrier,
engaged in both interstate and intrastate business, may use
the same airplane first for one schedule and then for the other.
Because it engages in intrastate flight must that airplane
be registered under the state law as well as under the federal
law? Must the pilot hold a state as well as a federal license?
UJnder these circumstances there is no reason why the state law
should not be upheld.54 Where, however, both pilot and airplane
are engaged solely in interstate commerce and have the required
federal license, may the states also demand licenses? If they
may, interstate pilots could be compelled to obtain a series of
licenses from many states as conditions precedent to flight over
their respective territories. This would indeed be a serious
interference with interstate commerce by airplane and any such
state requirements would very likely be held unconstitutional.'-
In a few states, the permissible height of flight differs from
the minimum altitude fixed by the federal Air Traffic Rules.
The latter provide that aircraft shall not be flown over cities
"except at a height sufficient to permit of a reasonably safe
emergency landing, which in no case shall be less than 1,000
feet." 5, Suppose an aviator flying from Maine to New York is
travelling over a city in Connecticut at a height of 1200 feet.
That state fixes the minimum altitude at 2,000 feet.-8 A crash
occurs and it is discovered that the flyer had not complied with
the state requirements as to altitude. Is he subject to penalty
under the state law? In fixing the minimum altitude, the state
is exercising its police power for the protection of its citizens.
The question then arises whether such police regulation, even
though it affects interstate commerce, is such an undue burden
In most states in which only a federal license is necessary, there is ap-
]parently no necessity to register such licenses with local authorities.
53 A similar problem arises where, for example, a state law requires safety
4evices on interstate carriers. Here also the question seems to be one of
fact-whether the regulation attempted is a reasonable means of securing
a valid end. See 2 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1004 et seq.
54In Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 (1888), a statute requiring loco-
motive engineers operating trains in the state to be licensed was held valid
as applied to engineers engaged in operating interstate trains exclusively.
5- Cf. Smith v. Alabama, supra note 54.
56 Conn. Pub. Acts 1929, c. 253, § 26 (a), (minimum altitude of 2000
feet) ; Mich. Pub. Acts 1926, No. 9, § 1 (minimum altitude of 1500 feet);
Vt. Laws 1929, Act No. 79, § 10, (minimum altitude of 2000 feet); W. Va.
Laws 1929, c. 61, § 12 (minimum altitude of 2500 feet). A minimum alti-
tude considerably greater than that provided in the Air Traffic Rules is
Tequired by ordinances of many municipalities.
- Am COMMERCE REGULATiONS § 74 G (1).
58 Conn. Pub. Acts, supra note 56.
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upon it as to be invalid59 A possible answer is that the height
specified as a minimum by state law or municipal ordinance
should be considered as the "height sufficient to permit of a
reasonably safe emergency landing" for that particular locality;
local authorities, with their intimate knowledge of prevailing
conditions, should be best qualified to prescribe such minimum
requirements. Such a rule would seem desirable and it seems
likely that where the state regulations do not appear unduly to
restrict interstate commerce, they will be upheld. As a practi-
cal matter, at the present time most state laws and municipal or-
dinances of this character are satisfied by compliance with federal
regulations.
Another situation in which the question of state interference
with interstate commerce arises is where common carriers by
airplane, engaging in interstate and intrastate business, are
required to obtain a certificate of public necessity in order to
act as common carriers in intrastate commerce. In an excellent
treatment of this questionc o the conclusion was reached that "an
interstate carrier by aircraft is not required to apply to the
public service commission of a state for a certificate of public
convenience covering its operations in interstate traffic, and a
state commission can exercise authority over such a carrier
only insofar as the carrier engages in intrastate commerce
within that state." 1
Statutes 62 setting forth the existence of a right of flight raise
an interesting point which may often be litigated. While an
owner of property over which an airplane occasionally passes
will hardly undertake to sue for trespass, those living in the
neighborhood of a flying field will often do so. In such an action
the pilot's defense that he has a right to fly under the local or
59 Every state statute which imposes a burden on interstate commerce is
not condemned. Those which are for a valid police purpose, and whose effect
on interstate commerce is only incidental, are constitutional. See supra
note 53.
See Williams, State Certification of Aerial Carriers (1928 )76 U. OF PA.
L. Rnv. 585. But see Davis, State Regulation of Aircraft Common Carrier
(1930) 1 Am L. Rv. 47.
61 Williams, op. cit. supra note 60, at 589.
62 § 4 of the UNE'ORDt STATE LAW FOR AEzONAuTicS provides: "Flight in
aircraft over the lands and waters of this State is lawful, unless at such
a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or
water or the space over the land or water is put by the owner, or unless
so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully
on the land or water beneath."
§ 10 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 provides: "As used in this Act, the
term 'navigable airspace' means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes
of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce under zection 3, and such
navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of inter-
state and foreign air navigation . . ."
YALE LAW JOURNAL
federal statute will be assailed on the ground that such statute
is a violation of the due process clause. The validity of this as-
sertion will probably be made to depend upon the existence of
property rights in air space in accordance with the maxim cuius
est solum ejus est usque ad coeln. The soundness of this
maxim, however, has been the subject of much discussion3 and
several lower federal courts have intimated that there are no
property rights in air space above a reasonable height of user.'
Likewise in the recent case of Smith v. New England Airport
Co.,65 the Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted the same view.
There the plaintiff owned a large tract adjoining the defendant's
airport, from which airplanes often took off over the plaintiff's
property. It appeared that except in one or two instances, these
airplanes flew over the plaintiff's property at a height exceeding
500 feet. The plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the de-
fendants from flying or causing airplanes to be flown over his
property. One of his contentions was that flight over the prop-
erity constituted a trespass, and that the state and federal stat-
utes, in so far as they sanctioned such flight over 500 feet were
unconstitutional. In holding for the defendants, the court con-
cluded that flight at an altitude of 500 feet did not constitute a
trespass, and that, accordingly, the statute did not result in
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
It is apparent that if private ownership of air space were up-
held, the development of aeronautics would face a serious ob-
stacle. The House Committee on the Air Commerce Act at-
tempted to meet this difficulty with the suggestion that Congress
could make public the right of aviation under the "commerce
63 For excellent treatments of the problems see SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE
(7th ed. 1924) 449; POLLOCK, TORTS (13th ed. 1929) 361; ZOLLMANN, op.
cit. supra note 23, at 5-29; Bell, Air Rights (1928) 23 ILL. L. REV. 250;
Bogert, op. cit. supra note 5, at 294; Eubank, Ownership of Airspace (1930)
34 DICK. L. REV. 75; Spurr, Let The Air Remain Free (1911) 18 CASE AND
COMMENT 119; Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land (1928)
76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 631; Valentine, The Air-A Realm of Law (1910) 22
JUR. REv. 85; note (1919) 32 HARV. L. REV. 569. It is significant that these
writers take the position that flight above a reasonable height of user does
not constitute a trespass. Cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States, 260 U. S. 327, 43 Sup. Ct. 135 (1922). And see F. P. Lee,
op. cit. supra note 37.
64 In Johnson v. Curtiss Airplane Co., [1928] U. S. Av. Rep. 42 (D. Minn.
1923), a temporary injunction was granted to a landowner restraining
flight by defendants over plaintiff's land at an altitude less than 2000 feet,
the minimum altitude fixed by statute for acrobatic flying. But the court
said: "The upper air is a natural heritage common to all the people, and
its reasonable use ought not to be hampered by an ancient artificial maxim
of law such as is here invoked." See also Commonwealth v. Nevin and
Smith, [1928] U. S. Av. Rep. 39 (Pa. Ct. of Quarter Sess. 1922).
65 170 N. E. 385 (1930); commented on in (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 579;
(1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 902; (1930) 1 AIR L. REV. 272.
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clause" by imposing an "easement," such as in the case of nav-
igable waters." The soundness of this analogy does not war-
rant serious consideration, for as it is generally conceded
that flight at a reasonable height does not constitute a trespass
there would seem to be little reason for becoming involved with
the superfluous concept of "easement." The social desirability of
recognizing no individual property rights in air space above the
altitude of user seems clear. Adequate protection to the land
owner might well be afforded under the doctrines of nuisanceGr
6G See LEGisLATi-vE HisTORy OF THE AIm CobuinRcE ACT, supra note 2, at
42-45.
6 7 In New England Airport v. Smith, supra note 65, the plaintiff attempted
to sustain his case for an injunction upon the theory of nuisance but the
point was decided against him.
